Since Christmas is quickly approaching, I want to point my readers, as I do every year, to a fantastic article by Stephen Carlson published in NTS in 2010 titled, "The Accommodations of Joseph and Mary in Bethlehem: Κατάλυμα in Luke 2.7." Carlson's study turns the traditional interpretation of the "inn" as being a kind of ancient hotel on its head. He also denies the view that Jesus was born in a stable or barn. Through a detailed lexical and semantic analysis of κατάλυμα and Jewish patrilocal marital customs during the time of Jesus, Carlson demonstrates that the reference to κατάλυμα in Luke 2.7 alludes to a marital chamber built on top, or onto the side of, the main room of a family village home. According to Carlson, the phrase διότι οὐκ ἦν αὐτοῖς τόπος ἐν τῷ καταλύματι should be rendered "because they did not have room in their place to stay." The reference to "their place" is the marital chamber attached to the family village home of Joseph where the married couple would have stayed for some time before finding their own place. Since there was no space in their room, Mary had to give birth in the larger main room of the house, where the rest of the family slept. Carlson also shows that it was common for a "manger" to be present in the main room of most Jewish homes and so this detail of the birth account is in keeping with Jewish living customs. I quote Carlson's conclusion found on page 342 of the article:

"Luke's infancy narrative therefore presupposes the following events. Joseph took his betrothed Mary from Nazareth to Bethlehem (2.5). Bethlehem was his hometown (v. 3) and, in accordance with the patrilocal marital customs of the day, it must also have been the place where they finalized their matrimonial arrangements by bringing her into his home. As a newly married man, he no longer would have to sleep in the main room of the village house with his other relatives, but he and his bride could stay in a marital chamber attached to the house until they could get a place of their own. They stayed there for some time until she came to full term (v. 6), and she gave birth to Jesus in the main room of the house rather than in her marital apartment because it was too small, and she laid the newborn in one of those mangers (v. 7) common to the main room of an ancient farmhouse. After staying at least another forty days in Bethlehem (v. 22; cf. Lev 12.2–8), Joseph and Mary eventually moved to Nazareth to make their home together in her family's town (v. 39; cf. 1.26–27). To be sure, this scenario as presupposed in Luke's infancy account diverges greatly from the conventional Christmas story. There is no inn, no innkeeper, and no stable. But it is grounded in a careful exegesis of the text."

This is one of those articles that can be described as truly being groundbreaking. Carlson's conclusions are so convincing that it would take considerable evidence to overturn them. Indeed, some may be uncomfortable with how this evidence changes the face of the traditional Christmas story and it does throw a wrench in how manger scenes are reenacted every year. But this interpretation is, as Carlson admits, "grounded in a careful exegesis of the text." This article needs to be circulated widely, not only among academics, but also pastors and lay people alike, because it has serious implications for how we should understand this story as told by Luke. Carlson has posted this article on his personal website and it can be found here. Happy reading and happy holidays to all!

The web is blowing up with articles and blog posts on the topic of the Gospel of Jesus’ Wife (GJW), discussions prompted by the recent publication of the latest issue of the Harvard Theological Review, which features the official publication of and scientific reports on the GJW. I have known about this papyrus for a long time and have repeatedly been asked to respond to claims being made in the media but I have refrained, until now. Today, I wish to address the provocative GJW but I shall avoid making claims about its authenticity or inauthenticity. Rather, I wish to address the scholarly enterprise around this piece in the hopes that it will create a momentary space for disciplinary self-reflection. Toward that end, I shall speak to two things: 1) historiography and 2) Western intellectualism and power differentials. 

The famous French scholar Michel de Certeau contended that the past becomes comprehensible to us only through the historian’s discourse of “facts.” The sine qua non of making history is, according to de Certeau, “an endless labor of differentiation” between a former period and the present. That is, meaning is formed through the process of negotiating the past and present. Such differentiation, according to de Certeau, takes place “along the margins which join a society with its past and with the very act of separating itself from that past” (The Writing of History, 37). It is only when accounts of the past and their interpretation in the present meet that something new is created. It is a “back and forth” between two poles of the “real.” The goal of historiography for de Certeau is the relocation of the past (preserved) into the conceptual (and narrative) framework of present discourse that unfolds or resuscitates the lost through labors of differentiation. 

This idea of the past rupturing into the present is nothing new of course; it is largely a critique of positivist history so dominant in the 18th and 19th centuries. But what interests me is the way in which narratives of or about the past shape our own identities. In other words, there is a social role of narratives concerning the past. Frank Ankersmit questions why it is that “our relationship to the past has become ‘privatized’ in the sense that it primarily is an attribute of the individual historian and no longer of a collective disciplinary historical subject” (Historical Representation, 153). We are now more than ever invested in retrieving the past because it is tied—whether consciously or unconsciously—to our search for personal identity. This is what Pierre Nora means by “modern memory” when he writes: “Modern memory, is, above all, archival. Fear of a rapid and final disappearance combines with anxiety about the meaning of the present and uncertainty about the future to give even the most humble testimony, the most modest vestige, the potential dignity of the memorable” (“Between Memory and History,” 13).

All of this has much relevance for the appraisal of cultural artifacts such as the GJW, and particularly those cultural artifacts which impinge on one’s religious identity. In the case of the GJW, the question about whether or not Jesus was married cannot simply be reduced to a concern about history; it is a religious question disguised as a historical one. So why is the question of Jesus’ marriage important anyway? Because it seeks to anchor one’s beliefs in a material reality. This is how history is often used. But it’s also not just about Jesus or religion in general. Even those scholars who admit that the GJW says nothing about the historical Jesus are participating in a discourse that is going nowhere. But why is it that scholars are so concerned about whether this text was written in the 2nd century, the 8th, or the 21st? Why have we privileged this text over against all the other texts on papyrus that get identified on a daily basis? 

That brings me to my second point. Western intellectualism has often been described in terms of hegemonic discourse that privileges knowledge produced by the intellectual elite over against the kinds of knowledge produced outside of the academy. Feminist and post-colonial scholars have done a lot to advance this idea, and I believe it is very relevant to the current discussion. I hasten to agree with Hector Avalos, when he says:

"Relevant knowledge must be grounded in an awareness of how knowledge is used to create class distinctions and power differentials. Biblical scholars, for example, are almost solely devoted to maintaining the cultural significance of the Bible not because any knowledge it provides is relevant to our world but because of the self-serving drive to protect the power position of the biblical studies profession" (The End of Biblical Studies, 23). 

It is time we stop and reflect on the extent to which the discussions about the GJW are a product of Western political, economic, and social interests (on this point, see Spivak’s Can the Subaltern Speak?). Why has a first-rate academic journal devoted almost an entire issue to a piece of papyrus whose authenticity is questionable? Why are scholars so vehement about answering the question of its authenticity? Why are certain scholars given space to voice their view while others are silenced? What are the motives behind those producing blog posts and articles concerning this cultural artifact? Why did Harvard University create a website specifically for the GJW? Why was a historical documentary on the GJW produced so soon after its discovery (and before its publication!)? 

I am currently editing, among other things, an unpublished Coptic papyrus fragment right now housed in an Ivy League institution that contains an unknown text that mentions Jesus, his cross, disciples, and cites a New Testament verse. Should the history channel run a documentary on this? Should Harvard Theological Review--or some other journal, for that matter—devote nearly a entire issue to this papyrus fragment? Should my institution create a website for it? We as historians should think long and hard about the production and dissemination of knowledge and the potential effects it might have on society as a whole. Is what we are doing relevant and meaningful for society and human progress? Are we encouraging and promoting intellectual hegemony through our own discourses about history (in this case, the GJW)?

It is also extremely interesting to me that the GJW has been submitted for such drawn-out testing, which is unprecedented. Yet no one expects these procedures for any other ancient document. It has always been the practice of papyrologists (those who study ancient texts and writing materials) to make judgments based on observation, but when it comes to highly religious texts (e.g., Gospel of Judas), we must test them “scientifically.” As one of my colleagues so astutely averred recently, “it also raises questions about our own scientific expertise: we’re not able, any more, apparently, to decide if those things are genuine, with our own Wissenschaft: we have to call on the ‘real’ scientists” (personal correspondence). 

The terms “forgery” and “fake” are also worth reflecting on in light of the discussion. Why are some (most?) scholars inclined to discount an object’s significance simply because it might be a forgery or fake? It is because we privilege what is historically “real” and “pure” and disregard those things which do not fit the bill. But modern forgeries are also very significant because they reflect our own, present historical imaginations and representations, even if the goal of the forger is to deceive. If we think of it in this sense, almost every early Christian text (including the New Testament) is a forgery, insofar as these authors sought to legitimatize their theological claims by contextualizing them within a historical framework that is often highly imaginative. So why are ancient historical imaginations privileged over modern ones? Because we are most interested in the foreign realities and minds of the past. This is a clear case of academic “othering” and intellectual elitism. 

In closing, I would simply like to suggest that we as historians stop over-privileging historical artifacts like the GJW. The question about the papyrus’ authenticity is less important, in my opinion, than the agendas and socio-political realities that drive the question itself. We want firm answers about the GJW, but we will not get the “facts” we want unless a living forger comes forward or the dead author (ancient or modern) comes back to life to tell the complete story. This is precisely how the writing of all history works and we should respect the “fragile and necessary boundary between a past object and a current praxis” (de Certeau, The Writing of History, 37). Let us move on as historians to other historical ideas, topics and artifacts instead of continuing to find ways to make the debate around the GJW more and more relevant. 

UPDATE: A fuller version of this post is available for download as a PDF here. 

My fine colleague here at Concordia University, Calogero A. Miceli, has written a blog post over on the Perspective Criticism blog titled, "Perpective Criticism and the Gerasene Demoniac (Mark 5:1-20)." Be sure to check it out!

In a 2012 issue of New Testament Studies, there is an article by Richard Last titled "Communities That Write: Christ-Groups, Associations, and Gospel Communities." The article challenges Richard Bauckham's "Gospel for all Christians" theory and proposes that the old view that states that Gospel authors wrote from within and for their own communities should be maintained. Last's biggest contribution is his methodology. He claims that genre criticism does not help us much, since genre (e.g., biography) does not tell us much at all about the Gospels' intended audiences. Instead of a genre approach, Last shows how ancient associations provide the closest analogy to early Gospel communities. Last claims that "associations wrote out of collective self-interest...since approval from the general membership was needed before association writings were deemed authoritative by the group, the content of association writings reflects the communal histories (narratives) and values (bylaws and decrees) of the group as a whole, not just the viewpoints of selected representatives." (182). Thus, according to Last, while we should uphold the standard view that Gospels were written from within andfor specific Gospel communities, we should no longer think of their authors as single representatives of those communities. Instead, the composition of a Gospel was a communal process that reflected the collective cultic ideologies of the "Christ-group." Last concludes: 

"There is now reason to suspect that communities, not just individual ‘spokespersons’, played an active role in the production of gospels, but Esler’s observation is right. The association evidence supports the intuitions of many gospel scholars by demonstrating that communities in antiquity wrote collaboratively as a group in a manner that fostered self-reflexivity and self-interest, and that made general readership an uninteresting and impractical goal. Early Christ-groups operated by the same conventions. This was the normal practice of composing a document from within an association, and it created an obstacle to their acceptance as authoritative texts by general audiences." (198).

This is a significant contribution to Gospels criticism that must be taken seriously. I am not persuaded by Bauckham's theory of "Gospels for all Christians" nor have I accepted his radical view that the traditions about Jesus were safeguarded by those who preserved and transmitted them. At least with regard to the former, Last has proposed a new way of thinking about the composition of Gospels that makes Bauckham's thesis untenable. At first blush, Last's attempt to forge a connection between "Christ groups" and ancient associations is successful, at least insofar as the analogy seems much closer with respect to the writing and function of group documents than is, say, genre. I am very interested in knowing how Last's theory has been received among NT scholars since its 2012 publication. The main issue, I think, will be to what extent we should read the writing practices of ancient associations into early Christian communities. That is, is there a way to prove that early "Christ groups" saw themselves as an "association" and that their group practices (such as writing) are perfectly consistent? Again, I find the analogy persuasive and helpful. In any case, there is no question: this article is a weighty one that will likely challenge quite a few followers of Bauckham, if not Bauckham himself. 

Last has made his NTS article available on his academia.edu webpage here.